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Susan N. Houseman
The Debate over the State 
of U.S. Manufacturing
How the Computer Industry Affects the 
Numbers and Perceptions
Since 2000, the U.S. manufacturing 
sector has lost 5.5 million jobs, or 
about a third of its employment base. In 
response to these employment losses, a 
large trade defi cit in manufactured goods, 
and concerns that U.S. manufacturing is 
losing its international competitiveness, 
President Obama recently announced the 
creation of a new cabinet-level Offi ce of 
Manufacturing Policy. 
The administration’s move to develop 
policies promoting U.S. manufacturing 
has many detractors, however. At the heart 
of the debate over the appropriate policy 
response is a basic disagreement over the 
actual state of U.S. manufacturing. Those 
who oppose government intervention 
typically argue there is little need. 
They point to robust output growth 
in manufacturing that, except during 
recessions, has outpaced average annual 
growth of the U.S. economy for decades. 
Employment losses, it is argued, are 
largely a consequence of extraordinary 
productivity growth, which in turn refl ects 
automation, not import competition. The 
U.S. manufacturing sector is healthy, 
according to this view. There is little or 
nothing to fi x.1 
The purpose of this article is to help 
reconcile the apparently contradictory 
sets of statistics that are brought to the 
debate. In particular, I argue that the 
aggregate manufacturing output and 
productivity statistics so commonly cited 
are widely misinterpreted. 
Aggregate statistics mask quite 
divergent trends within manufacturing. 
The rapid output and productivity 
growth of the manufacturing sector is 
largely attributable to one small industry: 
computers and electronic products. 
For most of manufacturing, output 
growth has been relatively weak and 
productivity growth modest. In addition, 
the extraordinary output growth in the 
U.S. computer industry does not signal 
U.S. competitiveness in manufacturing 
computer and electronic products, and 
productivity growth has not caused 
the steep employment declines in this 
industry. 
Different Statistics 
Paint Different Pictures
Output statistics such as those 
depicted in Figure 1 paint a rosy picture 
of the U.S. manufacturing sector. The 
fi gure, which plots indexes of real (price-
adjusted) GDP and manufacturing value 
added from 1997 to 2011, shows that, 
except during recessions, growth in 
manufacturing real value added outpaced 
growth in real GDP. Over the entire time 
period, manufacturing output growth was 
greater than that of GDP. 
In spite of its strong output growth, 
manufacturing employment has been 
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Figure 2  Manufacturing Employment, Number and as Percent of Nonfarm Payroll 
Employment, 1970-2011 
declining as a share of nonfarm payroll 
employment since the 1970s (Figure 2). 
The divergent output and employment 
trends are typically explained by the 
fact that labor productivity growth in 
manufacturing has also greatly outpaced 
that in the aggregate economy. From 
this perspective, recent employment 
declines in manufacturing seem part of 
a long-term trend. Numerous analysts 
have made analogies between the 
manufacturing sector and agriculture, 
which has experienced high output 
growth, but supports few jobs owing 
to the automation of farming. (See, for 
example, Reich [2009], Executive Offi ce 
of the President [2009], and Roxburgh et 
al. [2012].) 
A closer look at the manufacturing 
employment numbers, however, reveals 
a clear break in trend since 2000. Figure 
2, which also plots manufacturing 
employment levels from 1970 to the 
present, shows that manufacturing 
employment was relatively stable or 
experienced modest trend declines until 
2000.2 From 2000 to 2002 manufacturing 
employment fell by 2 million, or 12 
percent, and during the ensuing economic 
upturn, manufacturing employment 
continued to fall; this marked the fi rst 
time manufacturing employment failed to 
rebound following a recession. Over the 
decade from 2000 to 2010, manufacturing 
employment declined by 5.7 million, 
or one-third. The sudden and sharp 
employment losses in the manufacturing 
sector are hard to fully square with a 
story about productivity improvements 
driven by automation. And although press 
reports have heralded manufacturing’s 
employment gains in the last year, they 
are small compared to its losses during 
the Great Recession. Today, nonfarm 
payroll employment is 96 percent of what 
it was in 2007, immediately prior to the 
start of the recession; manufacturing 
employment is just 87 percent.
Trade statistics also give cause 
for concern about the state of U.S. 
manufacturing. Eighteen of the 19 
industries in the manufacturing sector run 
sizable trade defi cits, according to data 
published by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis; that is, the United States 
imports more than it exports in these 
industries’ product categories. Moreover, 
between 1998 (the fi rst year that these 
industry-level data are published) and 
2007, the ratio of net exports (exports less 
imports) to domestic use of an industry’s 
products worsened. This implies that 
domestic manufacturing output failed 
to keep pace with domestic use of 
manufactured goods. The picture has 
been more mixed since 2007, refl ecting 
the worldwide recession, but apparel, 
textiles, furniture, autos, electrical 
appliances, and computers continued to 
show a loss of competitiveness by this 
metric.
What Accounts for Manufacturing’s 
High Output Growth? 
Manufacturing’s strong growth in 
real value added seems at odds with 
the weak employment numbers and 
trade performance. These apparently 
Figure 1  Growth in Real GDP and Manufacturing Value Added, 1997–2011
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contradictory trends can be reconciled 
to a large degree by the fact that the 
manufacturing output statistics mask 
divergent trends within the manufacturing 
sector. 
Figure 3 shows average annual growth 
in real value added for the computers 
and electronic products industry and for 
manufacturing excluding the computer 
industry from 1997 to 2007 (the decade 
leading up to the Great Recession) 
and from 2000 to 2010 (a period that 
incorporates the recession). Real value 
added in the computer industry grew at 
a staggering rate of 22 percent per year 
from 1997 to 2007 and 16 percent per 
year from 2000 to 2010. In contrast, 
average annual growth of real value 
added in the rest of manufacturing was 
just 1.2 percent per year from 1997 to 
2007; real value added in the rest of 
manufacturing was actually about 6 
percent lower in 2010 than at the start of 
the decade. 
Although the computer and electronics 
products industry only accounted for 
10–12 percent of value added in the 
manufacturing sector throughout the 
period, it has an outsized effect on 
aggregate manufacturing statistics. 
Without the computer industry, 
manufacturing real value-added growth 
has been much weaker than overall 
growth in the economy (Figure 4).3 The 
computer industry has a similarly large 
impact on the aggregate manufacturing 
productivity statistics. For example, 
manufacturing multifactor productivity 
growth rates between 1997 and 2007 
fall by almost half when the computer 
industry is excluded (Houseman et al. 
2011).
The growth rates in Figures 3 and 
4 are based on published data. In 
addition, the sizable growth of imported 
intermediates used in manufacturing has 
likely imparted a signifi cant bias to real 
value added in the published statistics 
for all manufacturing industries. This 
bias arises because the price declines 
associated with the shift in sourcing 
to low-cost countries are not properly 
captured, which in turn results in an 
underestimation of the real growth in 
imports and an overestimation of the 
growth in real value added produced 
domestically. Accounting for offshoring 
bias, the average annual growth rate 
in real value added for manufacturing 
excluding computers was well under 
1 percent between 1997 and 2007 
(Houseman et al. 2011).
What Accounts for the Extraordinary 
Growth in Real Value Added and 
Productivity in the Computer Industry 
and What Does It Mean?
Is the computer and electronic 
products industry, which includes 
computers, semiconductors, and 
telecommunications equipment, the 
bright spot in American manufacturing? 
Not necessarily. Although some computer 
and electronics products companies 
headquartered in the United States are 
highly successful in product innovation 
and are competitive in international 
markets, the United States does not 
produce high-volume products in 
this industry anymore (Sturgeon and 
Kawakami 2010). And trade statistics 
cited above indicate that domestic 
production has not kept pace with 
consumption, leading to a widening trade 
defi cit in these products.
What accounts then for the rapid 
growth in real value added in this 
industry? At least part of the explanation 
concerns the adjustment of price 
indexes used to defl ate computers and 
semiconductors for improvements in 
quality. Computers and semiconductors 
are much more powerful today than they 
were a decade or even a year or two ago. 
Although product price indexes typically 
increase over time, for computers 
and semiconductors they have fallen 
rapidly. Largely refl ecting adjustments 
by statistical agencies to account for 
the increased power of computers and 
semiconductors, the price indexes used 
to adjust shipments of computers and 
semiconductors have fallen at a rate 
of 21 percent and 13 percent per year, 
respectively, from 1998 to 2010. Such 
rapid price drops imply, for example, that 
for the same dollar value of computer 
shipments, the quality-adjusted quantity 
(real value) is 13 times higher in 2010 
than in 1998.4
The rapid growth in real output 
coupled with a sharp drop in employment 
has led to surging productivity in the 
computer industry. But has productivity 
Figure 3  Average Annual Growth 
Rates of Real Value Added in 
Computers and Manufacturing 
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growth caused these employment 
declines? Analysts often interpret 
productivity growth to mean that workers 
are working faster or that automation 
(the substitution of capital for labor) 
is driving the growth, as illustrated 
in a recent White House report on 
manufacturing: “Manufacturing workers 
have paradoxically often been the victims 
of their sector’s own success, as rapid 
productivity growth has meant that goods 
can be produced with fewer workers” 
(Executive Offi ce of the President 2009).
Underpinning the computer industry’s 
rapid productivity growth, however, are 
price defl ators that, when adjusted for 
quality improvements, are rapidly falling. 
The productivity growth in the computer 
industry largely refl ects research and 
development innovations, and product 
improvements do not cause job losses. 
Today’s computer may be in some 
statistical sense the equivalent of, say, 13 
computers in 1998, but that does not, in 
and of itself, mean that fewer workers are 
needed to manufacture a computer today 
than in the past. In fact, job losses in the 
computer industry are attributable to the 
shift of electronics product manufacturing 
to Asia (see, for example, Roxburgh et al. 
2012). 
Conclusion 
Strong output and productivity 
statistics have led many to dismiss out-
of-hand concerns about the international 
competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing. 
The computer and electronics products 
industry, however, is driving these high 
growth rates in the aggregate statistics, 
despite the fact that this industry accounts 
for only about 10 percent of the sector’s 
value added and employment. The 
irony is that high output growth in the 
computer industry is a poor metric of 
the competitiveness of U.S. factories in 
making computer and related electronic 
products. The manufacturing of these 
products has largely moved to Asia. 
Competition from foreign suppliers, not 
high productivity growth, is responsible 
for the sharp employment declines in the 
computer industry.
Understanding the international 
competitiveness of manufacturing and 
the consequences of import competition 
for workers and businesses is critical for 
developing sound manufacturing policy. 
As a start, analysts and policymakers 
should recognize that the aggregate 
output and productivity statistics are not 
representative of what is happening in 
most of manufacturing. 
Notes
1.  See, for example, Kevin Hasset, http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-16/
obama-s-obsession-drives-progress-in-
reverse-commentary-by-kevin-hassett.html 
and Mark J. Perry, http://blog.american.
com/2012/02/u-s-manufacturing-is-already-
doing-remarkably-well-without-taxpayer-
help/. Atkinson et al. (2012, pp. 24–25) 
includes citations to many other prominent 
analysts and policymakers promoting this 
view. 
2.  The modest declines in manufacturing 
employment during the 1990s can be 
accounted for entirely by manufacturers’ 
increased use of staffi ng industry workers, 
who are not counted as manufacturing 
employees. Although in offi cial statistics 
manufacturing employment declined by 
4.1 percent from 1989 to 2000, taking 
into account temporary help and other 
staffi ng workers assigned to manufacturing, 
employment rose by an estimated 1.3 percent 
(Dey, Houseman, and Polivka forthcoming). 
3.  The reason this fact is not more widely 
known may have to do with the way the 
statistics are published. In the late 1990s, the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, along with 
the other U.S. statistical agencies, introduced 
the use of chained aggregates. Although 
BEA publishes value added in “real chained 
dollars” for all individual manufacturing 
industries, these industry-level real chained 
dollars cannot be summed to create a real 
series for subsets of industries. Growth rates 
for industry subsets may be approximated 
using a Törnqvist formula that uses both 
real and nominal value-added industry data. 
Specifi cally, the growth rate of real value-
added for a subset of industries, expressed as 
a logarithmic change, is approximately equal 
to the weighted average of the growth rates of 
the component industries,  
ln 1 , , , 1( / ) ln( / )t t i t i t i t
i
Q Q w q q? ???
where qi,t is the published real dollar or 
(equivalently) quantity index for industry i 
in year t and wi,t is the average of industry i’s 
share of nominal value added in adjacent time 
periods (t, t − 1); 
i
?wit = 1.
4.  The statistics for the computer and 
electronics products industry also may be 
subject to signifi cant measurement error, in 
addition to that discussed above. This industry 
has been characterized by rapid shifts in the 
sourcing of production and the development 
of global production chains that are diffi cult to 
capture in our statistical system, as currently 
designed. Such measurement error is the 
subject of on-going research supported by a 
Sloan Foundation grant that I am codirecting. 
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